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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN SEXUAL 




Despite more than 20 years of sexual harassment being unlawful, it is still a 
persistent problem in Australian workplaces and one which is grossly 
under-reported. The law is this area should seek both to redress the harm 
suffered by the victim and to reduce the power imbalance between males 
and females. The effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 in 
achieving these objectives was reviewed by a Senate Committee in 2008. 
One of its recommendations was for positive duties to be imposed on 
employers to eliminate sexual harassment. This article outlines how this 
recommendation might be implemented, and taken further, by shifting the 
onus away from the victim and onto the more powerful players in any 
sexual harassment scenario – the harasser, the employer and the 
community in the relevant workplace. 
I  INTRODUCTION 
Sexual harassment comprises a range of intimidating behaviours, which range 
from verbal teasing to conduct that is criminal, for example, sexual assault. 
Whilst sexual harassment may occur in many social settings (such as on the 
street or in the home), the focus of this article is employment,1 which is the 
area in which more than 90 per cent of complaints arise.2 Part II of this article 
provides statistics and describes the nature of sexual harassment in Australia.  
 
                                                 
 BA LLB (Hons) (Macquarie); LLM (ANU).  
1 Although it must be recognised that change in the public sphere cannot be achieved in 
isolation from addressing inequality in the private sphere – see Beth Gaze, ‘Twenty Years of 
the Sex Discrimination Act: Assessing its Achievements’ (2005) 30(1) Alternative Law 
Journal 3, 3.  
2 Peter Bailey, The Human Rights Enterprise in Australia and Internationally (2009) 577.  
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Sexual harassment is specifically proscribed by the Sex Discrimination 
Act 1984 (Cth). Two important objects of that Act are to ‘eliminate ... sexual 
harassment’ in certain areas and ‘to promote recognition and acceptance 
within the community of the principle of the equality of men and women’.3 
The current law is outlined in more detail in Part III of the article.  
The effectiveness of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 was assessed in 2008 by 
the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (hereafter 
‘Senate Committee’).4 Although the Act aims to eliminate sexual harassment 
and promote equality, the current law is constructed according to a complaint-
based model that relies on individual victims coming forward and reporting 
the harassment that they have experienced. The Senate Committee heard 
evidence of a number of problems with this approach.  
The Senate Committee was persuaded that the onus should be shifted 
somewhat, by imposing positive duties on employers. In its report of 
12 December 2008, it made the following recommendation: 
The Committee recommends that further consideration be given to 
amending the Act or the EOWW Act5 to provide for positive duties for 
public sector organisations, employers, educational institutions and other 
service providers to eliminate sex discrimination and sexual harassment, 
and promote gender equality.6  
The background that led the Senate Committee to make this recommendation, 
and the existence of positive duties in the United Kingdom, are outlined in 
Part IV of the article. 
The imposition of positive duties as a response to the problem of sexual 
harassment in workplaces involves a fundamental shift away from the 
complaint-based model adopted by the current law. This article explores how 
the Senate Committee’s recommendation might be implemented in Australia 
and questions whether positive duties will be effective if they are imposed 
only on employers. It is argued that it may be more beneficial to take the 
concept of positive duties further so that they extend to would-be harassers 
                                                 
3 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 3(c) and 3(d). 
4 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, 
Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 in 
Eliminating Discrimination and Promoting Gender Equality 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/sex_discrim/index.htm> at 1 August 
2009.  
5 Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Act 1999 (Cth). 
6 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 164 
(recommendation 40). 
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and to other members of the community, for example, witnesses to 
harassment. A model based on such duties is explained in Part V of the article.   
In Part VI, the article examines a reported sexual harassment decision to test 
whether a different outcome would have been reached if this ‘positive duty’ 
model had been applied. This examination will be followed by further 
assessment of the model in Part VII. 
II THE NATURE OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AUSTRALIA 
Before looking at legal responses to sexual harassment, it is useful to examine 
the prevalence of sexual harassment in Australian workplaces, the types of 
harm suffered by victims and the reporting rates.  
The then Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC)7 
conducted a national telephone survey in 2008, which found that ‘around one 
in three women in Australia aged 18–64 have experienced sexual harassment 
in their lifetime [and] the majority of sexual harassment continues to be 
experienced in the workplace’.8 The same survey found that ‘women are 
around four times as likely to experience sexual harassment compared to 
men’.9  
Further, the survey found the following about the reporting of sexual 
harassment: 
The number of people who have formally reported or made a complaint 
after experiencing sexual harassment has significantly decreased over the 
last five years. Only 16% of those who have been sexually harassed in the 
last five years in the workplace formally reported or made a complaint, 
compared to 32% in 2003.10 
Sexually harassing behaviour that has led to reported decisions includes: 
                                                 
7 HREOC’s name was recently changed to the Australian Human Rights Commission by the 
Disability Discrimination and Other Human Rights Legislation Amendment Act 2009 (Cth) 
which received Royal Assent on 8 July 2009. However, for the purposes of this article it will be 
referred to as HREOC. 
8 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Sexual Harassment: Serious 
Business (2008)(‘Serious Business’) 1.  
9 Ibid 12. 
10 Ibid 2. The complaints in question here include complaints within workplaces and to external 
agencies such as the state and territory equal opportunity commissions and the Australian 
Human Rights Commission: at 2 fn 4. 
192 DEAKIN LAW REVIEW VOLUME 14 NO 2 
 sending emails containing sexually suggestive cartoons and jokes: 
Kaldawi v Smiley;11 
 grabbing breasts and making inappropriate comments about breasts: 
Caton v Richmond Club Limited;12 and 
 requesting sexual intercourse for the provision of divorce papers 
which were needed by the complainant: McAlister v SEQ Aboriginal 
Corporation & Lamb.13 
The harm suffered by victims will obviously vary according to the type of 
harassment. At the more severe end of the spectrum, where a victim was 
raped and locked in a tunnel, she suffered an adjustment disorder and 
agoraphobia, requiring psychiatric and other counselling.14 In another case a 
detective constable who was sexually harassed by her manager for a lengthy 
period of time became depressed, suffered from serious mood swings and had 
inflammatory wheezing.15 
Given the very low percentage of people who report sexual harassment to 
agencies such as HREOC, and the fact that only a small proportion of these 
cases proceed to a formal judgment,16 the case law may be described as the 
‘tip of the iceberg’. However, people’s perceptions of how well their 
complaint will be dealt with can be one important factor in their decision 
whether to report the harassment or not. Twenty-one per cent of people 
surveyed by HREOC said that they did not report the sexual harassment 
experienced due to ‘lack of faith in the complaint process’.17 Therefore the 
way the law is framed and the complaint handling process play an important 
role in dealing with sexual harassment.  
                                                 
11 Kaldawi v Smiley [2002] VCAT 1754. 
12 Caton v Richmond Club Limited [2003] NSWADT 202. 
13 McAlister v SEZ Aboriginal Corporation & Lamb [2002] FMCA 109. 
14 Barker v Hobart City Council– unreported jury verdict 1993. See Roland Browne, ‘Common 
Law Victory’ (1993) 18(5) Alternative Law Journal 243, 243.  
15 Stubbs v Chief Constable Lincolnshire Police 30 July 1999, ET Case No 38395 of 1996.  
16 The HREOC 2008 telephone survey found that 3 per cent of reported complaints were 
finalised by a court: Serious Business, above n 8, 32. Thornton’s research found that the less 
than 2 per cent of complaints are heard by a court: Margaret Thornton, ‘Sex Discrimination, 
Courts and Corporate Power’ (‘Courts and Corporate Power’) (2008) 36 Federal Law Review 
31, 34.  
17 HREOC, Serious Business, above n 8, 2. 
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III CURRENT LAW (COMMONWEALTH) 
When the Commonwealth first passed the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, it 
contained a specific provision on sexual harassment, which was amended in 
1992.18 Subsection 28A(1) of the Commonwealth Act currently defines sexual 
harassment as follows:  
 a person sexually harasses another person (the person harassed) if:  
(a) the person makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an 
unwelcome request for sexual favours, to the person harassed; 
or  
(b) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in 
relation to the person harassed;  
 in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all 
 the circumstances, would have anticipated that the person harassed 
 would be offended, humiliated or intimidated.  
There are three key elements of this definition: First, that the conduct is 
‘unwelcome’; second that the conduct is of a ‘sexual nature’; and, third, that 
the ‘reasonable person’ would have anticipated the reaction of the victim, that 
is, that the victim would feel ‘offended, humiliated or intimidated’. These 
elements will be considered in turn, followed by a discussion of when 
vicarious liability can be imposed on employers.  
A  Unwelcome Conduct 
The first key element of this definition is that the conduct is ‘unwelcome’. In 
Aldridge v Booth it was held that the advance, request or conduct was 
unwelcome if it was ‘not solicited or invited by the employee, and the 
employee regarded the conduct as undesirable or offensive’.19 HREOC notes 
that this is a subjective criterion, that is, it will be viewed from the perspective 
of the complainant.20 
                                                 
18 For a discussion of the historical development of Commonwealth legislation governing 
sexual harassment see Gail Mason and Anna Chapman, ‘Defining Sexual Harassment: A 
History of the Commonwealth Legislation and its Critiques’ (2003) 31 Federal Law Review 
195. 
19 Aldridge v Booth (1988) 80 ALR 1, 5. 
20 Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC), Effectively Preventing and 
Responding to Sexual Harassment: A Code of Practice for Employers (2008)(‘Code of 
Practice’) 6. 
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B  Conduct of a ‘Sexual Nature’ 
HREOC notes that ‘[t]he sexual element of sexual harassment is rarely 
contentious: in most complaints received by the Commission the alleged 
harassment is clearly of a sexual nature’.21 Courts and tribunals will look at 
the context in which the conduct occurred. For example, in one case flicking 
rubber bands at a woman’s legs was found to be conduct of a sexual nature 
because it consisted of part of an overall pattern of sexual behaviour.22 
C  Reasonable Person Would Have Anticipated the 
 Reaction of the Victim 
The final key element of the definition is the response of the hypothetical 
‘reasonable person’. The law adopts a case-by-case approach to this 
requirement. For example, in finding that putting an arm around a co-worker 
could be sexual harassment, Member Tahmindjis of the Queensland Anti-
Discrimination Tribunal stated: 
Whether an action is compassionate or reprehensible will depend on the 
overall context in every case. The context here is that the action was not one 
between friends of long standing: it was an action by a middle-aged male 
employer to a young female who had only worked in the office for two 
weeks.23 
The Senate Committee heard evidence that this element of the definition is 
particularly problematic. This is discussed in Part IV of this article.  
D  Vicarious Liability 
Section 106 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) imposes vicarious 
liability on employers for unlawful acts done by employees in connection 
with their employment. Liability will not be imposed if ‘all reasonable steps’ 
were taken to prevent the behaviour.24 The steps taken by an employer will be 
considered by courts and tribunals on a case-by-case basis and what is 
reasonable in the circumstances can vary according to factors such as the size 
of the business. Generally speaking, decision-makers have required employers 
                                                 
21 Ibid 7. 
22 Shiels v James and Lipman Pty Ltd [2000] FMCA 2; referred to in HREOC, Code of 
Practice, above n 20, 7. 
23 Smith v Hehir and Financial Advisors Aust Pty Ltd [2001] QADT 11; cited by HREOC, 
Code of Practice, above n 20, 9. 
24 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 106(2). 
2009                                                   SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL       195 
to show that they have a sexual harassment policy in place (drafted according 
to HREOC’s Sexual Harassment Code) that has been implemented, for 
example, through training, education, and translation into other languages if 
necessary.25  
Easteal and Saunders’ recent study of the outcomes of cases involving claims 
of vicarious liability found that liability is quite often imposed on employers. 
The statistics were as follows: 
[O]f the 26 Commonwealth cases which included vicarious liability, the 
complaint against the employer was upheld in 16. In seven of the 10 in 
which the employer was not found liable, it was held that sexual harassment 
had not taken place. In only two of the 26 vicarious liability cases were 
there findings that there was no liability by an employer.26 
IV  SENATE COMMITTEE INQUIRY INTO THE 
 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE SEX DISCRIMINATION ACT 
On 26 June 2008 the Senate Committee was given a reference by the Senate 
to inquire into and report on the effectiveness of the Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 in eliminating discrimination and promoting gender 
equality. The Senate Committee received 81 submissions and held a number 
of public hearings in September 2008. The Senate Committee’s report was 
dated 12 December 2008 and made 43 recommendations. There has been no 
government response to this report to date.  
A  General Findings and Summary of 
Recommendations 
The overall finding of the Senate Committee was that:  
the Act has had an impact on the most overt forms of sex discrimination but 
has been less successful in addressing systemic discrimination. ‘Systemic 
discrimination’ refers to policies, practices or patterns of behaviour, which 
are absorbed into the institutions and structure of society, that create or 
perpetuate disadvantage for a particular group.27  
                                                 
25 See Patricia Easteal and Skye Saunders, ‘Interpreting Vicarious Liability with a Broad Brush 
in Sexual Harassment Cases’ (2008) 33(2) Alternative Law Journal 75, 78–9.  
26 Ibid 108.  
27 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 47. 
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HREOC’s submission to the inquiry noted that systemic discrimination 
includes work practices and systems which condone sexual harassment.28  
Evidence given to the Senate Committee supports the HREOC survey 
findings outlined in Part II that sexual harassment continues to be prevalent 
and is grossly under-reported. For example, a survey conducted by Engineers 
Australia found that 22 per cent of female engineers had experienced sexual 
harassment.29 A survey conducted by the Shop Assistant’s Union found that, 
of those who had experienced sexual harassment in the workplace, over one 
third did not report it as they thought management would ignore their 
complaint.30 
The high percentage of women who report having experienced sexual 
harassment and the low reporting rate are indications that, overall, legal and 
other methods of preventing sexual harassment have been ineffective. That is, 
the law is failing to achieve the goal of promoting equality between women 
and men. 
The Senate Committee made specific recommendations about how the Act 
should deal with sexual harassment. Its recommendations covered the areas 
of: the definition of sexual harassment,31 extension of the application of the 
provisions,32 the complaints process33 the exemptions from the Act34 and the 
powers of HREOC and the Sex Discrimination Commissioner.35 
The Senate Committee made six recommendations requiring further 
consultation by the Attorney-General’s Department36 and, significantly, the 
Senate Committee recommended that a ‘public inquiry to examine the merits 
                                                 
28 HREOC submission to Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 in Eliminating Discrimination and Promoting Gender Equality 
(2008) (‘Submission’) 36. 
29 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 59–60 (citing 
submission from the Association of Professional Engineers, Scientists and Managers).  
30 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 60 (citing 
submission from the Australian Council of Trade Unions). 
31 Recommendations 15 and 16, which are discussed in more detail later in this section of the 
article. Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 153–4. 
32 Recommendation 17 was that students be given protection from harassment and 
recommendation 18 was that the Act also apply to harassment by ‘customers, clients and other 
persons’, ibid 154.  
33 See recommendations 19–24, ibid 156–7. 
34 See recommendations 25–8, ibid 159. 
35 Recommendations 29–33, ibid 161. 
36 Recommendations 35–42, ibid 162–4. 
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of replacing the existing federal anti-discrimination acts with a single Equality 
Act’ be conducted by 2011.37 Cusack has argued that such a review would be 
an important step towards a ‘new vision’ for the Australian government – a 
vision which would prioritise the elimination of systemic forms of 
discrimination.38  
B  Recommendations about the Definition of Sexual 
 Harassment 
The Senate Committee received submissions and heard evidence about 
problems associated with the third element of the definition in particular, that 
is, the requirement that ‘a reasonable person, having regard to all the 
circumstances, would have anticipated that the person harassed would be 
offended, humiliated or intimidated’.39    
Separately from the Senate Committee process, the ‘reasonable person’ 
concept has been the subject of much critique, particularly by feminist 
scholars.40 The first basis on which it can be critiqued is that what is 
considered ‘reasonable’ is likely to vary significantly from decision-maker to 
decision-maker. Taking this one step further, feminist scholars have argued 
that ‘reasonableness’ is derived from a male perspective, due to the ‘gendered 
origins of the standard’ and male power to ‘define gender relations’.41 
Assuming that this is true, it would mean that, despite sounding neutral and 
objective, the ‘reasonable person’ concept necessarily fails to take into 
account women’s experiences.42 
The inadequacy of a gender-neutral standard of reasonableness has led some 
scholars to argue that a ‘reasonable woman’ standard should be adopted 
instead,43 which is an approach that has received some acceptance by the 
                                                 
37 Recommendation 43, ibid 165. 
38 Simone Cusack, ‘Discrimination Against Women: Combating its Compound and Systemic 
Forms’ (2009) 34(2) Alternative Law Journal 86, 91. 
39 Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) s 28A(1). 
40 The concept may be critiqued on other grounds that are beyond the scope of this article, for 
example, the application of the standard to disabled people and children – see Mayo Moran, 
Rethinking the Reasonable Person: An Egalitarian Reconstruction of the Objective Standard 
(2003). 
41 Ibid 276–7. 
42 Mason and Chapman, above n 18, 218. 
43 See for example Caroline Forell, ‘Reasonable Woman Standard of Care’ (1992) 11 
University of Tasmania Law Review 1.  
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lower courts in the United States of America (but has not been accepted by the 
Supreme Court).44 
The first US decision to adopt a ‘reasonable woman’ standard was Ellison v 
Brady.45 Shoenfelt et al consider that the decision relied on social science 
research about men’s and women’s different perceptions of sexually harassing 
behaviour.46 The court explained the reasons for using the standard as follows: 
We note that the reasonable victim standard we adopt today classifies 
conduct as unlawful sexual harassment even when harassers do not realize 
that their conduct creates a hostile working environment. Well-intentioned 
compliments by co-workers or supervisors can form the basis of a sexual 
harassment cause of action if a reasonable victim of the same sex as the 
plaintiff would consider the comments sufficiently severe or pervasive to 
alter a condition of employment and create an abusive working 
environment.47 
Whilst the ‘reasonable woman’ standard has received some acceptance in the 
United States of America, it has not been adopted in Australia. The 
formulation that most closely approximates the ‘reasonable woman’ standard 
is section 58 of the Australian Capital Territory’s Discrimination Act 1991 
which provides that 
a person subjects someone else to sexual harassment if the person makes 
an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for sexual favours, 
to the other person or engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual 
nature in circumstances in which the other person reasonably feels 
offended, humiliated or intimidated (emphasis in original).      
This formulation refers to circumstances in which the victim herself 
‘reasonably feels offended, humiliated or intimidated’ (as opposed to referring 
to how the harasser expects the victim to react).48 
The ‘reasonable woman’ standard does not overcome the problem of 
individual decision-makers using their own standards to reach a decision. As 
Ashraf puts it, ‘[i]f male judges are now forced to apply a reasonable woman 
standard, how can we be so sure that they are now applying a reasonable 
                                                 
44 Moran, above n 40, 277–8. 
45 Ellison v Brady, 924 F 2d 872 (9th Cir 1991). 
46 See discussion by Elizabeth Shoenfelt, Allison Maue and JoAnn Nelson, ‘Reasonable Person 
Versus Reasonable Woman: Does it Matter?’ (2002) 10 American University Journal of 
Gender, Social Policy and the Law 633, 647–51. 
47 Ellison v Brady 924 F 2d 872 (9th Cir 1991) 880–1. 
48 See also s 87(11) of South Australia’s Equal Opportunity Act 1984. 
2009                                                   SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW: TOWARDS A NEW MODEL       199 
woman’s perception rather than a male-biased view of what the reasonable 
woman’s perception is?’49 
The oft-quoted decision of Justice Einfeld in Hall, Oliver and Reid v 
Sheiban50 provides a case on point. Einfeld J found that any ‘sensible woman’ 
would not have been offended by the employer’s behaviour, which included 
asking women in an interview if they were sexually active and, once they 
were employed, lowering the zips on their uniforms and making sexualised 
comments.51 Although overturned on appeal, this decision does show that the 
views of the decision-maker can easily infiltrate the standard of 
‘reasonableness’.52 
The ‘reasonable woman’ standard has also been critiqued on ideological 
grounds. For example, Finley argues that it 
implies that women’s experiences and reactions are something for women 
only, rather than normal human responses. Since women are a significant 
proportion of persons, their experiences should count as the experiences of a 
reasonable person, not merely as the experiences of a reasonable woman.53 
Last, it has also been critiqued for adopting a unitary notion of ‘women’s 
experience’. In reality, women’s experiences are multidimensional and it 
would be difficult for any objective standard (whether the ‘reasonable person’ 
or ‘reasonable woman’ standard) to capture this.54 
The Senate Committee heard that the requirement that a person be ‘offended, 
humiliated or intimidated’ introduces an element of morality into the law. 
This echoes the concerns of commentators who argue that this element of the 
definition undermines women’s equality. Specifically, it is argued that, when 
                                                 
49 Saba Ashraf, ‘The Reasonableness of the “Reasonable Woman” Standard: An Evaluation of 
its use in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment Claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act’ (1992) 21 Hofstra Law Review 483, 500. 
50 Hall, Oliver and Reid v Sheiban (1988) EOC ¶92-227. 
51 See discussion by Regina Graycar and Jenny Morgan, The Hidden Gender of Law (2nd ed, 
2002) 392–3. 
52 For more recent Commonwealth examples, see Fiona Pace, ‘Concepts of “Reasonableness” 
in Sexual Harassment Legislation: Did Queensland Get it Right?’ (2003) 3 Queensland 
University of Technology Law and Justice Journal 1, 14–15. 
53 Lucinda Finley, ‘A Break in the Silence: Including Women’s Issues in a Torts Course’ 
(1989) 1 Yale Journal of Law and Feminism 41, 64. 
54 Ashraf, above n 49, 502. 
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establishing whether the victim was treated less favourably than a man, the 
focus should be on equality, rather than morality.55 
The Senate Committee’s conclusion was that wording based on the 
Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 would be preferable. Section 119 of 
that Act defines sexual harassment as follows:   
Sexual harassment happens if a person –  
(a) subjects another person to an unsolicited act of physical intimacy; or  
(b) makes an unsolicited demand or request (whether directly or by 
implication) for sexual favours from the other person; or  
(c) makes a remark with sexual connotations relating to the other 
person; or  
(d) engages in any other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in 
relation to the other person;  
and the person engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) 
or (d) does so –  
(e) with the intention of offending, humiliating or intimidating the other 
person; or  
(f) in circumstances where a reasonable person would have anticipated 
the possibility that the other person would be offended, humiliated or 
intimidated by the conduct.  
The Senate Committee’s recommendation 15 was that the Commonwealth 
definition ‘be amended to provide that sexual harassment occurs if a 
reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the person 
harassed would be offended, humiliated or intimidated’.56  
Further, it recommended that ‘the circumstances relevant to determining 
whether a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the 
other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct’ be 
specified in the Act and include factors such as the ‘sex, age and race of the 
other person’.57  
                                                 
55 This debate is summarised by Mason and Chapman, above n 18, 220–1. 
56 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 153. 
57 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 153–4 
(Recommendation 16). The other circumstances listed were ‘any impairment that the other 
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While this does not remove the concept of reasonableness, it does involve a 
shift in focus away from the victim and on to the harasser’s conduct.58 This is 
a shift that may well be successful. Following a detailed comparison of the 
approach to reasonableness in Queensland and other jurisdictions, Pace 
concludes that ‘Queensland has formulated, applied and continues to apply a 
definition of sexual harassment that does not seem to attract the problems 
identified in other jurisdictions’.59 
C  Recommendation on Positive Duties 
Of key interest for the purposes of this article, is recommendation 40 (quoted 
in the Introduction to this article), which entails imposing positive duties on 
employers to eliminate sexual harassment and promote gender equality.60 This 
recommendation falls under the heading ‘recommendations requiring further 
consultation’ and the Senate Committee suggested that the Attorney-General’s 
Department conduct this consultation within 12 months.61  
Some background to this recommendation is found in the submissions to the 
inquiry. HREOC submitted that the way the vicarious liability provisions in 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) are currently framed, if an employer 
has taken ‘all reasonable steps’ to prevent harassment, they may avoid 
liability. However, ‘the failure to take such steps is not actionable of itself’.62 
That is, unless sexual harassment occurs and a complaint is brought, there is 
no examination of whether an employer has taken any steps to prevent sexual 
harassment from occurring. HREOC submits that it would be more effective if 
there were a positive obligation on employers and if failure to meet this 
obligation were actionable without any sexual harassment having taken 
place.63  
The Anti-Discrimination Commission of Queensland and the Western 
Australian Equal Opportunity Commission submitted that they support the 
introduction of positive duties into Australian law.64 The Western Australian 
                                                                                                                    
person has; the relationship between the other person and the person engaging in the conduct; 
and any other circumstance of the other person’. 
58 Pace, above n 52, 16.   
59 Ibid 21. 
60 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 164. 
61 Ibid 163. 
62 HREOC, Submission, above n 28, 143. 
63 Ibid 144. 
64 Anti-Discrimination Commission Queensland, Submission to the Senate Standing Committee 
on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Effectiveness of 
the Commonwealth Sex Discrimination Act 1984 in Eliminating Discrimination and 
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Commission’s submission discusses the positive duties in existence in the 
United Kingdom in some detail.65  
D  Positive Duties in the United Kingdom 
The Senate Committee noted in the summary of their views that ‘the positive 
duties under the Equality Act 2006 (UK) may provide a useful model which 
could be adopted and applied either to public sector organisations or to both 
the public and private sector’,66 without providing any details about the 
operation of the law in the United Kingdom.  
Part 4 of the Equality Act 2006 (UK) inserted section 76A into the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975 (UK), which commenced on 7 April 2007.67 That 
section imposes the following statutory duty on public authorities: 
A public authority shall in carrying out its functions have due regard to the 
need –  
(a) to eliminate unlawful discrimination and harassment, and 
(b) to promote equality of opportunity between men and women.  
There are some limitations on the application of the duty. Besides not 
applying to the private sector, it does not apply to all public authorities either. 
(The authorities that are exempt are set out in subsection 76A(3) and include, 
for example, the House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Church of 
England and the Secret Intelligence Service). Further, the duty does not apply 
to the exercise of judicial and parliamentary functions.68  
The duties imposed by the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) need to be read 
in conjunction with the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Public Authorities) 
(Statutory Duties) Order 2006 which was made on 7 November 2006. That 
Order provides that all authorities listed in the schedule to the Order must 
publish a Gender Equality Scheme by 30 April 2007. Examples of the 
                                                                                                                    
Promoting Gender Equality (2008) 10; Western Australian Equal Opportunity Commission 
Submission to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
Parliament of Australia, Inquiry into the Effectiveness of the Commonwealth Sex 
Discrimination Act 1984 in Eliminating Discrimination and Promoting Gender Equality 
(2008) 3. 
65 Brief reference to the UK law is made in the submission by the South Australian Equal 
Opportunity Commission and the Office for Women.  
66 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 163. 
67 The Equality Act 2006 (Commencement No 1) Order 2006. 
68 See Equality Act 2006 (UK) s 76A(4). 
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authorities covered include the British Library and Museum, the 
Commissioner of Police and the naval, military and air forces.  
A Gender Equality Scheme must outline the objectives which the authority 
has identified as necessary to comply with the duty in section 76A;69 it must 
be reviewed every three years following which a revised scheme must be 
published;70 and there is also an annual reporting requirement, namely that the 
authority must publish an annual report of its action taken towards achieving 
the objectives.71  
A further step towards imposing positive duties on employers was taken in 
2008 through the introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 
(Amendment) Regulations 2008. The 2008 regulations amended section 6 of 
the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) so that an employer can be held liable 
where a third party (for example, a customer) subjects a woman to harassment 
in the course of her employment, if the employer has failed to take reasonably 
practicable steps to prevent harassment by third parties.72 The employer must 
have known that the employee had been harassed by a third party on at least 
two other occasions, but not necessarily by the same third party.73 This is 
likely to impose the heaviest burden in industries, such as hospitality and 
retail, where staff are dealing with a large volume of customers.74   
Fredman has highlighted some limitations of the UK legislation. It does not 
extend to private functions of public authorities and, more significantly, it 
does not apply to private bodies at all. She writes that ‘public bodies or 
private bodies with public functions will be at a competitive disadvantage as 
against those private employers who need not comply until subject to an 
individual complaint’.75  
                                                 
69 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) Order 2006 s 2(4). 
70 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) Order 2006 s 4. 
71 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (Public Authorities) (Statutory Duties) Order 2006 s 6. 
72 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) ss 6(2B) and 6(2D). Note that recommendation 18 made 
by the Senate Committee aims to deal with the same problem. It reads ‘the committee 
recommends that the Act be amended to protect workers from sexual harassment by 
customers, clients and other persons with whom they come into contact in connection with 
their employment’: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 
4, 154. 
73 Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (UK) ss 6(2C) and 6(2D) 
74 For further discussion of the background to these regulations see Richard Nicolle ‘Hands 
off!’ (2008) 158 New Law Journal 725.  
75 Sandra Fredman ‘Reforming Equal Pay Laws’ (2008) 37 Industrial Law Journal 193, 214. 
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E  Victoria’s Review of Equal Opportunity Laws 
The Victorian Department of Justice recently reviewed the Victorian Equal 
Opportunity Act 1995. This review sought to overcome the limited application 
of the UK legislation by recommending a positive ‘duty to eliminate 
discrimination as far as possible’ that would apply to both the public and 
private sectors.76 The review envisaged that enforcement could occur through 
the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission’s ‘own 
motion inquiries without the need for an individual complaint’, although it is 
stated that the primary duty of the Commission should be education and 
assistance such that organisations comply with the duty.77   
The Victorian government’s 2009 statement of intentions announced that the 
government was working on legislation to respond to the review, which it 
expects to introduce into Parliament in late 2009 or early 2010.78 
V  A NEW MODEL 
A deficiency in the current Australian law is that it relies on victims making 
complaints, which large numbers of women are unwilling to do. Therefore 
shifting the onus away from the victim is a logical response. There is a 
common element in the development in this direction so far. The UK 
legislation, and the Australian Senate Committee and Victorian 
recommendations are all framed so as to impose a positive duty on employers, 
who are clearly in a position of power vis-à-vis their employees (both victims 
and harassers).  
A  Advantages of Positive Duties 
A significant advantage of the imposition of positive duties over the current 
individual complaint-based system is that it is forward looking. It is about 
preventing harassment from occurring, instead of taking action after sexual 
harassment has taken place.  
In the context of reforming equal pay laws, Fredman has highlighted two 
significant advantages or benefits flowing from positive duties. The first is 
                                                 
76 Victorian Department of Justice, An Equality Act for a Fairer Victoria: Equal Opportunity 
Review Final Report (2008) 40–1.  
77 Ibid 41. 
78 The Premier of Victoria, Annual Statement of Government Intentions (2009) 
<http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/state-of-government-intentions/statement-of-government-
intentions.html> at 29 August 2009.  
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that they take the ‘burden off individual complainants’.79  This is relevant in 
the Australian context, as the statistics show that many victims of harassment 
do not bring forward a complaint for various reasons.  
These might include the fact that there is no Commonwealth legal aid funding 
to bring a sex discrimination case.80 It is left to the complainant to pay legal 
costs, often when they are unemployed,81 or to represent themselves against 
their employer who is likely to be well resourced and able to employ a team 
of legal representatives.82 If complainants lose their case they must pay their 
own costs and there is a trend for complainants to be ordered to pay the 
respondent’s costs.83 The power imbalance of the parties may mean that it is 
difficult for complainants to build up the courage to make a complaint.   
The second advantage of positive duties highlighted by Fredman is that 
‘positive duties require action to be taken by all employers, not just those 
subject to a successful complaint’.84 This would also be beneficial in the 
Australian context as a recent survey by the Equal Opportunity for Women in 
the Workplace Agency found that 40 per cent of organisations do not provide 
any training on sexual harassment.85 The current law does nothing to regulate 
those workplaces, unless a complaint is made. Even if a successful complaint 
is brought forward, an employer may choose to pay compensation and then do 
nothing to prevent harassment from occurring in the future.  
                                                 
79 Fredman, above n 75, 212. 
80 Gaze, above n 1, 6. This was considered by the Senate Committee and recommendation 24 of 
their report was ‘the committee recommends increased funding be provided to the working 
women’s centres, community legal centres, specialist low cost legal services and legal aid to 
ensure they have the resources to provide advice for sex discrimination and sexual harassment 
matters’: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 157.  
81 Margaret Thornton, ‘Sexual Harassment Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination’ (2002) 26 
Melbourne University Law Review 422, 440 (‘Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination’).  
82 Gaze, above n 1, 6. On the subject of corporate litigants see Thornton, ‘Courts and Corporate 
Power’, above n 16, 35.  
83 Thornton, ‘Courts and Corporate Power’, above n 16, 39. This was recognised as a deterrent 
by the Senate Committee: Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, 
above n 4, 156. 
84 Fredman, above n 75, 212.  
85 The precise findings were reported to be that ‘59.1% of organisations provide sex-based 
harassment training for employees, and slightly less provided training to managers (55.4%)’: 
Australian Government Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency, Survey into 
Paid Maternity Leave, Sex-based Harassment Initiatives and the Gender Pay Gap (2009) 10. 
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B  Imposing Duties on Employers 
As outlined in Part IV, in the United Kingdom compliance with positive 
duties requires employers to have a Gender Equality Scheme in place and to 
comply with the associated reporting requirements. A mechanism of this kind 
would be useful in the Australian context, but is insufficient on its own. As 
the Equal Opportunity for Women in the Workplace Agency has observed, 
‘the level of complaints and limited training show that policies alone are not 
sufficient’.86 Any duty on employers should require them proactively to 
ensure appropriate supervision of employees such that harassment is 
identified early, otherwise liability will be imposed. 
There is a parallel here with existing tort law principles. A negligence action 
arose in Western Australia when a prisoner was assaulted on two occasions by 
other prison inmates. The ‘mere fact’ that the assaults occurred was held to be 
insufficient to establish a breach of duty by the prison authority. However, the 
court held that the prison authority’s duty to take reasonable care for the 
safety of prisoners required a system of supervision. This was either lacking, 
or was not properly implemented, which led to the authority’s liability.87 
Imposing duties on all employers raises the question of the scope of the duty. 
There is merit in the Victorian Department of Justice’s review finding that the 
duty should apply to both the public and private sectors.88 As sexual 
harassment is prevalent in both types of workplace, there should be a duty to 
eliminate it from both.  
Systems of supervision will not involve a radical departure from what many 
employers are already doing to avoid vicarious liability. As outlined in 
Part III, currently vicarious liability will not be imposed if ‘all reasonable 
steps’ were taken to prevent the behaviour. However, under the current law, 
this only becomes an issue when a complaint is made and, as mentioned 
above, there are a substantial number of employers who do not even provide 
any training to their employees. Therefore, the big difference is that 
reasonable steps, in accordance with a public statement about the way they 
intend to comply with the duty, will need to be taken by all employers.  
                                                 
86 Ibid 12.  
87 Nada v Knight [1990] Aust Tort Reports 81-032, 67,922 (Pidgeon J). 
88 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 76, 40. 
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This is not without its benefit to employers. The Senate Committee heard 
evidence that it is common for women who complain of sexual harassment to 
leave the workplace.89 If harassment is prevented in all workplaces,  
 employers avoid court ordered damages pay-outs (and associated 
costs of litigation) and the loss of the skills of employees who leave 
because of harassment;90 and 
 employees are able to continue their employment in a harassment-free 
workplace, which should make the workplace more attractive to 
potential employees.  
C  Limitations of Imposing Duties on Employers 
There is no doubt that positive duties might be seen to impose a heavy burden 
on employers, especially small businesses. One potential response to this is 
that there are already costs involved when a discrimination complaint is 
brought. There are legal expenses, and there is a trend towards increasingly 
generous damages payouts being awarded by courts and tribunals.91 
Furthermore, victims often leave the workplace, taking their skills and 
experience with them. The suggested model front-loads the costs, so that they 
are targeted at prevention. Many employers are already taking reasonable 
steps and complying with HREOC’s Sexual Harassment Code to prevent 
vicarious liability being imposed. This would continue under the new model. 
The main difference for those employers would be the preparation of a 
Gender Equality Scheme and the associated reporting requirements. In all 
cases employers would need to have policies and systems of supervision in 
place. However, the advantages of a harassment-free workplace should 
outweigh the burden imposed by this scheme.  
Small business contexts, where the employer and the harasser are one and the 
same, are problematic. In a large number of cases reported to the Victorian 
Commissioner the sexual harassment had taken place in small businesses 
                                                 
89 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 60. 
90 However, Thornton notes that ‘the possibility of litigation is built into the risk management 
plans of corporations’: Thornton, ‘Courts and Corporate Power’, above n 16, 35.  
91 Joe Catanzariti, ‘Sexual harassment claim: significant damages payout plus costs’ (2008) 
14(5) Employment Law Bulletin 42. Recent examples include Poniatowska v Hickinbotham 
[2009] FCA 680 (23 June 2009) where the damages award was $466 000 and Whitlock v 
Bunnings, DP and DF [2009] QADT 14 (22 May 2009) where the complainant was awarded 
$132 818.65.  
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where the complainant was the only employee who was not a member of the 
harasser’s family.92  
A New South Wales example is Taylor v Sciberras.93 Ms Taylor was sexually 
harassed by her boss, Mr Sciberras, who was the owner of the fish and chips 
shop where she was employed. For the majority of the time they were the only 
people working at the shop (which is when the harassment occurred), except 
for occasions when Mr Sciberras’ wife was assisting with the evening shifts. 
Thus there were no witnesses to the harassment and no one more senior than 
her harasser for Ms Taylor to turn to.  
Such businesses would be required to comply with positive duties under the 
suggested model, but their failure to do so would still require the victim to 
bring forward a complaint.  
D  Role of the Sex Discrimination Commissioner 
A more effective way of addressing the small business scenario just discussed 
is to take a further step along the continuum and give greater powers to the 
Sex Discrimination Commissioner.   
The Senate Committee recommended a role for the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner that would support the positive duties model. 
Recommendation 37 of its report was:  
that further consideration be given to amending the Act to give the Sex 
Discrimination Commissioner the power to investigate alleged breaches of 
the Act, without requiring an individual complaint.94  
The Victorian review also recommended ‘own motion inquiries’ by the 
Victorian Commission.95 
This power would complement the imposition of positive duties because it 
would remove the burden on victims of sexual harassment which exists under 
the current law, and it would also operate as a further incentive for employers 
to comply with their new duties, that is, to avoid investigation that can lead to 
the imposition of liability.  
                                                 
92 Jenny Morgan, ‘Sexual Harassment and the Public/Private Dichotomy: Equality, Morality 
and Manners’ in Margaret Thornton (ed), Public and Private. Feminist Legal Debates (1995) 
89, 101.  
93 Taylor v Sciberras [2004] NSWADT 104.  
94 Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, above n 4, 163. 
95 Victorian Department of Justice, above n 76, 41. 
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E  Extending Duties to Would-be Harassers and 
 Bystanders 
It is notable that the existing UK duty and the proposed duties recommended 
by the Senate Committee and Victorian Department of Justice apply only to 
employers. Fredman has warned against reliance on employers in the context 
of attempts to achieve pay equity. She writes that there is a ‘need to ensure 
that it does not become a unilateral, top-down exercise, left entirely in the 
hands of the employer’.96 After all, the employer cannot conceivably control 
every action of every employee. Nor can the Sex Discrimination 
Commissioner investigate every workplace in Australia.  
A move further along a continuum of shifting the onus away from the victim 
could entail placing some responsibility for preventing harassment on would-
be harassers, who are arguably best placed to eradicate harassment. Once 
more, there are parallels with tort law, particularly the duty of care in 
negligence. This is now firmly statute-based, under the Civil Liability Acts in 
various jurisdictions.97 
In some jurisdictions, a tort-based approach is used specifically to respond to 
harassment. For example, in the United States of America the tort of 
‘intentional infliction of emotional distress’ encompasses harassment. Section 
46 of the Second Restatement of Torts (1966) defines the tort of ‘intentional 
infliction of emotional distress’ as the imposition of liability for ‘intentionally 
or recklessly’ causing ‘severe emotional distress’ where the conduct is found 
to have been ‘extreme or outrageous’.98 This test for harassment would be 
difficult to satisfy due to the requirements of ‘extreme or outrageous conduct’ 
causing ‘severe emotional distress’. The commentary on this provision 
suggests that the legislators intended to draw a line between conduct that is 
merely unpleasant and that which comprises ‘tortious unpleasantness’.99 
In the early 1990s a tort-based approach to harassment emerged in the United 
Kingdom, based on intentional infliction of emotional distress and private 
                                                 
96 Fredman, above n 75, 212.  
97 See Joachim Dietrich, ‘Duty of care under the “Civil Liability Acts”’ (2005) 13 Torts Law 
Journal 17. 
98 For a discussion of the historical development of the tort of harassment in the United States 
of America, see Martin Lishexian Lee, ‘The Need for a Tort of Harassment’ (2001) 5 
Southern Cross University Law Review 189, 192–4. For a discussion of the application of this 
tort in broader contexts than sexual harassment see Frank Cavico ‘The Tort of Intentional 
Infliction of Emotional Distress in the Private Employment Sector’ (2003) 21 Hofstra Labor 
and Employment Law Journal 109. 
99 Richard Townsend-Smith, ‘Harassment as a Tort in English and American Law: The 
Boundaries of Wilkinson v Downton’ (1995) 24 Anglo-American Law Review 299, 313. 
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nuisance.100 However, this was short-lived101 and harassment law is now 
firmly statute-based.102  
There have been suggestions that there should be a tort of harassment in 
Australia.103 It is outside the scope of this article to enter this debate. The 
parallel with tort law is merely drawn to show that people already have duties 
to their fellow workers, and imposing a duty not to harass would complement 
the duties already imposed on employers.   
The final category of people in the workplace who might be subject to 
positive duties is witnesses and bystanders who are aware that harassment is 
occurring (for example, through having been told by the victim). The HREOC 
survey found that ‘over one in ten Australians have witnessed sexual 
harassment in the workplace in the last five years’.104 In some instances, these 
witnesses may have been able to take action, such as reporting the harassment 
to management.  
The current law governing sexual harassment imposes no requirements on 
witnesses or bystanders. To use tort law as a comparison once more – there is 
no duty in torts law to take action to prevent another person from suffering 
harm, even when that harm is foreseeable.105 Tort law does, however, offer 
protection to so-called ‘good Samaritans’ who choose to assist someone who 
is in need. For example, when a person chooses to provide assistance (that is, 
to be a ‘good Samaritan’) and something goes wrong, the question of the good 
Samaritan’s liability arises. At common (tort) law, liability has never been 
imposed in such a situation. Furthermore, recent legislation has provided 
immunity as an extra measure of protection for the ‘good Samaritan’ (in all 
jurisdictions except Tasmania).106 In summary, tort law goes to great lengths 
                                                 
100 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669. For commentary on how these torts were 
applied see Keith Stanton, ‘Harassment: An Emerging Tort?’ (1993) Tort Law Review 179. 
For commentary on the historical development of the tort of harassment in the United 
Kingdom, see Lee, above n 97, 190–2.   
101 Khorasandjian v Bush [1993] 3 All ER 669 was overruled by the House of Lords in 1997 in 
Hunter v Canary Wharf [1997] 2 All ER 426. 
102 Protection from Harassment Act 1997 (UK). 
103 See for example Shampa Sinha, ‘Sexual Harassment and the Common Law’ (1993) 18(2) 
Alternative Law Journal 58, and Lee, above n 98.  
104 HREOC, Serious Business, above n 8, 1. 
105 Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman (1985) 157 CLR 424; Hawkins v Clayton (1988) 164 
CLR 539; Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549.  
106 Dietrich, above n 97, 27. See also James Tibballs, ‘Legal Liabilities for Assistance and Lack 
of Assistance Rendered by Good Samaritans, Volunteers and Their Organisations’ (2005) 16 
Insurance Law Journal 254.  
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to protect people who choose to assist, given that they are under no obligation 
to do so.   
Returning to the context of sexual harassment, at present the imposition of 
positive duties on witnesses and bystanders might well be a step too far. There 
may be a host of reasons why people would be reluctant to come forward to 
assist a victim of sexual harassment, including fear of reprisal by the harasser, 
their personal opinion that the victim should stand up for themselves, or 
concern about their own employment status (especially if they are employed 
on a non-ongoing basis). 
Community support for the imposition of legal duties on witnesses and 
bystanders therefore seems unlikely. The mandatory inclusion in an 
employer’s Gender Equality Scheme of provisions for the education of 
witnesses as to their moral obligation to intervene, to the extent that they are 
able, to prevent sexual harassment, and to report if the harassment continues, 
may be an alternative. 
A combination of: 1) positive duties imposed on employers and would-be 
harassers, 2) education of everyone in the workplace, and 3) new powers for 
the Sex Discrimination Commissioner would amount to a new model of anti-
harassment regulation. Would such a model make a difference? 
VI  TESTING THE MODEL 
The case of McKenna v State of Victoria107 (hereafter the ‘McKenna case’) 
involved a hostile work environment where the complainant, a Victorian 
police officer, was subjected to a range of harassing conduct by a number of 
her male colleagues. The case will now be considered in the light of the new 
model, following a summary of the facts and the decision that was reached by 
the Victorian Anti-Discrimination Tribunal (the Tribunal).   
A  Facts and the Tribunal’s Findings 
The complainant made a number of discrimination claims against a number of 
respondents, all of whom were employed by the Victorian Police. The 
conduct at issue had occurred over a number of years. It is beyond the scope 
of this article to outline all the claims, so the focus of this discussion will be 
the sexual harassment and the procedures in place for preventing 
discrimination in the workplace. 
                                                 
107 McKenna v State of Victoria [1998] EOC ¶92-927 (‘McKenna’). 
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The Tribunal heard evidence that the Bairnsdale police station was a work 
environment where sexist remarks about the role of women being ‘in the 
home’ and sexist jokes were commonplace. Coarse language and obscenities 
were held by the Tribunal to have been part of the environment in which the 
complainant worked.108 
The incidents of sexual harassment occurred during a week of nightshift work. 
The complainant asserted that on the first occasion her supervisor grabbed her 
and pulled her onto his lap, on the second occasion he said ‘come on, Narelle, 
how about a head job’ and on the third occasion he tried to push her into a 
holding cell. Ms McKenna gave evidence that, in this last situation, she was 
very fearful about what he might have done to her.109 On each occasion, she 
told her work partner that she did not want to be anywhere near her harasser 
and they stayed out on patrol, away from the station, for the rest of the shift. 
She also spoke to a sergeant and a colleague about the problems she was 
experiencing.  
The Tribunal was satisfied that: 
the supervisor of the complainant … made it reasonably appear to the 
complainant … that her working conditions were contingent upon her 
acceptance of his sexual advances or toleration of his persistent sexual 
suggestions or innuendo.110  
The complainant transferred to a different police station where she was 
victimised because she had lodged a complaint with the Victorian Equal 
Opportunity and Human Rights Commission about events which had occurred 
at Bairnsdale police station. This added to the harm she suffered, leading to a 
mental breakdown, following which she took an overdose of valium.111 
The Tribunal’s findings about the harm caused to the complainant relate to the 
combined effect of her various complaints. She was found to have been  
exposed to considerable pain and suffering, to debilitating physical 
symptoms, to mental breakdown, to humiliation, loss of self esteem and of 
                                                 
108 This section of the judgment is not reported by CCH, but may be found in McKenna v State 
of Victoria [1998] VADT 83 (1 June 1998) under the heading ‘4.1 Subjection of the 
complainant by the first respondent to a sexist work environment, hostile to women or 
unmarried women’.  
109 McKenna v State of Victoria [1998] EOC ¶92-927, 78 171. 
110 Ibid 174.  
111 Ibid 185–9.  
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self confidence, and to loss of normal enjoyment of her professional and 
private life.112 
The Tribunal awarded her $125 000 compensation.113  
Of note for the purposes of this article were the procedures (or the lack of 
procedures) in place for the observance of equal employment opportunity 
(EEO) conditions in the Victorian police force. This was relevant to the 
Tribunal’s assessment of the liability of the Victorian police and its finding 
that vicarious liability should be imposed. The Tribunal heard evidence that 
there were one-day EEO courses available to all police officers at the time, 
but only EEO contact officers were required to attend.114 None of the 
respondents in the McKenna case had attended any training. The EEO contact 
officer at the Bairnsdale station at the time of the events found out about his 
appointment as contact officer when he saw his name on the notice board and 
had not attended any training.115  
The Tribunal heard evidence from the highest officer in the Victorian police 
force in charge of EEO matters (the manager of the EEO unit) that showed he 
was not aware of recent ministerial discussions on sexual harassment, nor of 
the findings of surveys about incidents of sexual harassment in police forces 
in other jurisdictions.116 The Tribunal found that:  
the force appears to have done little to instil in its leaders and senior 
members a sense of commitment to a culture and management standards for 
the organisation that brought with it an expectation that every member 
conform to non discriminatory standards in their work, professional 
behaviour and attitude.117 
The question is: would the new model outlined in this article have made a 
difference to the course of events in the McKenna case?  
 
                                                 
112 Ibid 195.  
113 Ibid 197. This was appealed to the Supreme Court of Victoria, but the challenge failed – see 
State of Victoria v McKenna [1999] VSC 310 [263]. 
114 McKenna v State of Victoria [1998] EOC ¶92-927, 78 182.  
115 Ibid 182–3.  
116 Ibid 183. 
117 Ibid 184. 
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B  Applying the Model 
In the McKenna case, there were three specific instances of sexual harassment 
which the complainant told other officers about. If a duty were imposed on 
harassers, and if bystanders (in this case Ms McKenna’s work partner and 
other people she spoke to) were appropriately trained about their option to 
report harassment, the likelihood that each incident would have been reported 
to management would have increased.   
When management became aware that sexist remarks and harassing behaviour 
were being directed at Ms McKenna, they would have had a responsibility to 
caution the harasser against continuing this behaviour. If the behaviour 
continued, the employer would have needed to consider ways to prevent the 
harasser’s interaction with Ms McKenna, such as making sure they were not 
rostered on the same shifts. This would be part of management’s 
responsibility to provide a system of supervision in the workplace. 
Would any of this have made a difference to Ms McKenna? Perhaps the key 
difference would be that she would not have felt so isolated. The supporting 
action of colleagues may have been encouraging to her and may have 
increased her resolve to persist in drawing management’s attention to the 
harassing behaviour. Furthermore, if management were proactive as required 
by their duty to supervise, the harassment may have stopped before it had 
escalated to the stage where Ms McKenna was being pushed into a holding 
cell.  
If the harasser had failed to respond to warnings, the duty of the employer 
may have justified taking formal disciplinary action against the harasser.  
A significant difference to this scenario would be the requirement for the 
Victorian Police Force to have a Gender Equality Scheme with the associated 
reporting requirements. Such public reporting requirements would operate as 
an incentive for senior management to ensure that there was adequate training 
and awareness of the anti-harassment policies at all levels of the police force. 
The training in particular would have reduced the chances of victimisation by 
officers at a different police station.  
A major reason why Ms McKenna felt reluctant to make a complaint was the 
culture in the police force that discouraged the ‘dobbing’ in of colleagues.118 
Her concerns were well founded in light of the victimisation and further harm 
that flowed from her subsequent complaint to an external body. Such a culture 
                                                 
118 This problem has been discussed by Thornton in relation to the McKenna case, and other 
cases – see Thornton, ‘Losing Sight of Sex Discrimination’, above n 81, 432. 
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should be challenged from the top down. It is submitted that imposing a 
positive duty on employers to guard against sexual harassment would be a 
more effective way to facilitate this cultural change than through the current 
legislative arrangements. At least two reasons can be given. First, imposition 
of a duty is aimed at prevention of the problem, rather than dealing with 
complaints after the fact. Second, the onus is on those in power to make sure 
that harassment is not taking place, or that it is dealt with promptly if it does 
occur.  
The Sex Discrimination Commissioner’s suggested new power might also 
provide a weapon against the culture of sexual harassment, especially if 
investigations were carried out.  
In summary, the model would have led to different outcomes in the McKenna 
case in the following ways: 
 the police force would have had an anti-harassment policy and a 
degree of public accountability, which would have been major 
incentives to conduct proper training throughout the organisation. 
Such training would, in turn, have encouraged witnesses and 
bystanders to report harassment to management. 
 if harassment had occurred it is likely that it would have been 
reported to management earlier and responded to before it escalated, 
therefore limiting the harm suffered by the victim; and 
 the complainant would have been more likely to receive support 
throughout the complaint process (both by her colleagues in the 
station where the harassment took place and by management), rather 
than being victimised when she moved to a different station.   
VII  FURTHER ASSESSMENT OF THE MODEL 
In addition to the general advantages of imposing positive duties on 
employers, the application of the model shows that the reporting rates are 
likely to improve because reporting may be done by witnesses and bystanders 
(if they so choose), rather than just victims. This is important given that lack 
of reporting is a major obstacle to the effectiveness of the existing law.119 
Employers should be alerted to harassment at an early stage, either by the 
victim or through any witnesses or bystanders. This should prevent the 
harassment from escalating and allow an early remedy. The Sex 
                                                 
119 See discussion in Parts II and IVA of this article.  
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Discrimination Commissioner’s proposed powers should also lead to early 
detection of sexual harassment in workplaces.  
Increased reporting produces another benefit, which is the generation of a 
powerful message that sexual harassment is unacceptable. The generation of 
such a message is also one of the goals of tort law – the goal of defining when 
community norms are violated, so that it is clear what type of behaviour is 
wrongful.120 When a judge pronounces that there is a legal duty of care that 
has been breached (in the case of tort law), or that there has been a breach of 
positive duties to prevent sexual harassment (in the present context), it sends a 
clear message to the community that standards and expectations have been 
violated.121  
Thornton has suggested that, because there are very few appellate decisions in 
the area of sex discrimination, particularly by the High Court which has 
decided only three sex discrimination cases in the last 30 years, these 
appellate decisions ‘carry a great deal of weight’.122 One of the objects of the 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) is that both women and men should be 
treated equally. Decisions by judges have an important role to play in 
achieving this objective, as they define examples of behaviour that have 
violated this goal.   
It must be recognised, however, that law reform will never be sufficient of 
itself to change community attitudes and behaviour; nor will any sexual 
harassment law be enough to address inequality between the sexes. The model 
does not stop people who are intent on sexually harassing their colleagues, as 
those people will make sure they act when no one else is around. This 
certainly happens now and the model does little to shift the onus away from 
the victim in these circumstances. The main difference might be in the 
employer’s duty to respond if a victim does come to them for assistance.  
                                                 
120 This line of argument is used by Decle about the Stolen Generation – see Peace Decle, ‘The 
Stolen Generation. Can State Governments be Held Responsible for Reparation through the 
Law of Torts?’ (1998) 23 Alternative Law Journal 168; about exposure of prisoners to HIV 
by Malkin – see Ian Malkin, ‘Tort Law’s Role in Preventing Prisoners’ Exposure to HIV 
Infection while in Her Majesty’s Custody’ (1995) 20 Melbourne University Law Review 423; 
and about harm suffered by children in immigration detention by Mackay – see Anita 
Mackay, ‘Harm Suffered by Children in Immigration Detention: Can Tort Law Provide 
Redress?’ (2006) 14 Tort Law Review 16. 
121 Malkin, above n 120, 436. 
122 Thornton, above n 16, 35. In this article, Thornton provides a detailed discussion of the High 
Court’s consideration of sex discrimination.  
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VIII  CONCLUSION 
Sexual harassment is a persistent problem in Australian workplaces, which 
has led bodies such as the Senate Committee to consider different possible 
solutions to it. Imposing positive duties on employers is a way to shift the 
onus away from the victim and on to those with more power, but the extent to 
which the law should travel along this continuum is open to debate.  
The goals of eliminating sexual harassment and promoting the principle of the 
equality of women and men are certainly worthwhile. Positive duties, such as 
the ones placed on employers in the United Kingdom, have distinct 
advantages over the complaint-based approach that the Australian law 
currently adopts. No doubt there will be further examination of the advantages 
and disadvantages of various models as the Senate Committee’s 
recommendations are debated.   
 
